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This symposium invites reflection on a number of important ques-
tions concerning the independence of the independent regulatory agen-
cies. Three such questions are briefly examined in this essay: First, what
is the nature of an independent agency? Second, why should regulatory
agencies be independent? Finally, what constrains, and what ought to
constrain, an agency's independence? These questions are considered
against the backdrop of the legal debate about the constitutional legiti-
macy of independent regulatory agencies that has been raging since Con-
gress created the first such agency a hundred years ago. The thoughts
and conclusions offered in this essay draw on the history and recent expe-
rience of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"
or "the Commission"), long recognized as one of the finest independent
agencies.
I. WHAT IS AN INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY?
An independent regulatory agency is a government entity that fre-
quently exercises executive, judicial and legislative power over a specifi-
cally defined area of government interest. In a word, independent
agencies are the fourth branch of government, operating separately from
but under the oversight or review of the other three. The SEC is a prime
example of such an agency.
The SEC was established by Congress in 1934. Its enabling legisla-
tion is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act). That Act1
provides that the Commission be composed of five commissioners (in-
cluding a Chairman) appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. The commissioners are appointed for fixed terms of
five years. They can be removed from office by the President only for
good cause, and cannot be removed by the Congress except through the
drastic method of impeachment by the House of Representatives and
* Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California. Commissioner of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 1984-88.
Former Commissioner Peters acknowledges the assistance of Robert Mills, Counsel to Associ-
ate General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, in the prepa-
ration of this article.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d (West Supp. 1988).
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trial by the Senate. As a result of this structure, the commissioners (like
the heads of other independent agencies) are somewhat shielded from the
vagaries of shifting political opinion. In addition, the 1934 Act does not
allow more than three of the five commissioners to be members of the
same political party.
The Commission does not operate under the specific direction of the
judicial, legislative or executive branches of government. For example,
the Commission is empowered to sue in its own name to enjoin violations
of the securities laws and to seek other equitable relief without the ap-
proval of the Department of Justice.2 Moreover, the Commission can
formulate policy for the government by exercising its authority to adopt
rules that implement the objectives of the federal securities laws. These
rules have the same legal force as statutes and are promulgated without
prior approval from Congress. Under certain circumstances, the Com-
mission is also authorized to conduct quasi-judicial proceedings to sanc-
tion individuals and entities for violating provisions of the securities
laws.3 As when it initiates court actions, the Commission can perform
this quasi-judicial function without the advice or approval of either the
executive or legislative branch.
The SEC also may recommend and comment on legislation without
consulting with the executive branch or other agencies. Indeed, Con-
gress has specifically provided that the Commission cannot be required
to submit legislative recommendations, testimony, or comments on legis-
lation to any office or agency of the government for review before it sub-
mits them to Congress, as long as the views submitted are identified as
the Commission's and not the administration's.4 Of course, as a matter
of prudence and courtesy the Commission does consult with other agen-
cies of government in formulating major legislative positions. A recent
example of the Commission drafting and obtaining the passage of major
legislation on its own initiative is the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984, which penalizes persons who unlawfully trade in securities while
possessing material, nonpublic information. The penalties can be as high
as three times the gain obtained or loss avoided.5
Notwithstanding their independence, regulatory agencies are subject
to influence from the legislative and executive branches. The President,
2. A limited exception involves appeals to the United States Supreme Court, where the con-
currence of the Solicitor General normally must be obtained.
3. In general the Commission may institute administrative proceedings against regulated enti-
ties or persons (e.g., broker/dealers) for violating the securities laws or against any person for violat-
ing or causing violations of certain provisions. See Securities Exchange Act § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 250 (1982).
5. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986)).
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for example, has significant influence over the SEC through his power of
appointment. In particular, he is able to substantively affect the policy
direction of the agency by appointing commissioners who share his phi-
losophy. Of special importance is the power to appoint the Commis-
sion's Chairman. The Chairman, who serves in that capacity at the
President's pleasure, 6 has primary responsibility for the management of
the Commission, and thus significantly influences its policies, particularly
through the general control of the Commission's calendar and the use
and expenditure of its funds. However, since the Commission may act
only by the majority vote of its members, individual commissioners can
also influence the Commission's orientation, agenda and special projects.
By using his power of appointment, President Reagan has proven
able to influence the direction of the SEC. As a result, the SEC has suc-
cessfully completed a number of deregulatory initiatives, most of which
have been salutary, during the past seven years. For example, the Com-
mission has integrated and streamlined the disclosure system of the fed-
eral securities laws.7 This major revision of the Commission's
regulations has increased corporations' financing flexibility and reduced
their expenses by well over $350 million per annum,8 while reducing the
Commission's paperwork. At the same time, these changes were
designed to maintain a system of adequate and timely disclosure of mate-
rial information to the investing public. In another initiative, the Com-
mission has freed up over $700 million of the securities industry's capital
by updating the SEC's net capital requirements for broker/dealers and
by permitting the use of letters of credit for clearinghouse deposits and
stock loan collateral.9 The Commission has also eased its regulations
governing financing of small businesses, including the adoption and sub-
sequent expansion of Regulation D, which exempts certain securities of-
ferings from registration.10
The Senate, of course, influences the Commission through the con-
firmation process, in which the Senate can exact promises from nominee
commissioners or even reject their nominations.
While the independence of regulatory agencies yields many advan-
tages, it can present problems as well. One problem area is the resolution
6. Upon a change in administration, the Chairman of the SEC is expected to tender his resig-
nation to the new President. However, neither he nor the other commissioners are required to resign
their posts.
7. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889 (1983); Securities Act Re-
lease No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982).
8. SEC, Fi -r YEARS OF THE U.S. SECURrrIs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 74 (1984).
9. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-18,417 to 34-18,420, 47 Fed. Reg. 3512 (1982);
Exchange Act ReleAse No. 34-18,377, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,759 (1982).
10. SEC, supra note 8, at 75; Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982).
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of interagency disputes. When two departments of the executive branch
are in conflict, the President provides a resolution by simply choosing
one course of action over another. However, when independent agencies
disagree, there may be no simple means of reconciling their differences;
this increases the probability of unseemly interagency squabbles. Even
when agencies negotiate and resolve their disputes through negotiation,
legislation or judicial action may be necessary to effect the agencies' com-
promise agreements.
The potential scope and complexity of interagency disputes are
demonstrated by the controversy surrounding the question of regulatory
jurisdiction over new financial products. The development of products
such as futures on currency and options and futures on stock indexes
provoked vigorous and heated debates between the SEC and the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) about who should regulate
these new products. Efforts to resolve these issues resulted in a 1982
SEC/CFTC accord. However, in order for the accord to have any effect,
Congress had to enact implementing legislation.11
Notwithstanding the SEC's correctly held position that futures on
stock indexes were securities subject to its jurisdiction, the compromise
struck in the SEC/CFTC accord gave jurisdiction to the CFTC. That
compromise, while clearly justifiable at the time, proved to be improvi-
dent. Today, the SEC and the CFTC are facing the same, but exacer-
bated, jurisdictional issues. The October 1987 market break
demonstrated that the market for stock index futures and the market for
equities have become linked, so that transactions in one have a direct
effect on the other.12 Thus, the market break highlighted the need for
consolidating regulatory authority over futures on stock indexes with
that over the other securities markets. Yet the SEC, the agency statuto-
rily responsible for regulating securities markets, lacks the power to re-
solve this problem on its own because of its status as an independent
agency. Congressional action, difficult to accomplish in the best of times
on less controversial matters, is necessary to effect consolidation.1 3
11. The accord was enacted in the Securities Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96
Stat. 1409 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b, 78c(10), 78i, 78bb(a), 78111(14), 80a-2(a)(36), 80b-2(13)
(West Supp. 1988)), and The Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983)
(codifed as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
12. SEC Recommendations Regarding the October 1987 Market Break 5 (1988), reprinted in
"Black Monday," The Stock Market Crash of October 19, 1987 Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 141, 144 (1988) (testimony of David
S. Ruder, Feb. 3, 1988).
13. Letter from Chairman of SEC to President of Senate (July 7, 1988) (SEC's proposed
amendments to the federal securities laws and the Commodity Exchange Act), summarized in SEC
Submits Legislative Proposal to Expand Oversight of Margin Setting, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 28, at 1096 (July 15, 1988).
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Pending congressional action, the regulatory scheme governing these
markets creates potential harm for the markets and investors.
II. WHY IS INDEPENDENCE IMPORTANT FOR REGULATORY
AGENCIES?
The simplest answer to the question why regulatory agencies exer-
cising executive power are independent of the executive branch is that
Congress so ordained it. Beyond that, however, it is instructive to ask
why Congress chose to entrust the administration of numerous laws to
independent agencies rather than to an executive office. The answer to
this question probably lies in the historical growth and development of
government as the society it governed became more diverse and complex.
Where an agency is created to effectuate Congressional policy on compli-
cated issues in accord with legislative standards, "'Congress [does] not
wish to have hang over the... [agency] the Damocles' sword of removal
by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on
that Commission men of his own choosing.' "14
Congress has resorted to the device of an independent regulatory
agency on innumerable occasions during the past century when it has
been faced with the need to regulate developing areas of national interest.
Since the first regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
was created in 1887, legal scholars have argued that independent agen-
cies are unconstitutional because they violate the separation of powers
doctrine and constitute an unlawful delegation of executive power.
These scholars argue that the Constitution strictly limits how govern-
mental power may be exercised and who may exercise it, thus creating a
government of carefully separated powers deemed necessary for the pres-
ervation of "a strong government of free people." Independent agencies
are viewed by these commentators as undermining the "original struc-
tural design that is, in the final analysis, the bedrock of our liberties." 15
When it comes to justifying the independence of regulatory agencies
against such arguments, historical and philosophical arguments must be
tempered by pragmatism. Observation confirms that different adminis-
trations have different philosophies on how this nation should run. As a
consequence, a reversal of public policy, especially in such areas as social
welfare, education and foreign policy, often accompanies a change in ad-
ministration. Apparently, Congress was in 1887, and is today, of the view
that abrupt reversals in policy would be unfortunately disruptive if they
14. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (1988) (quoting Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.
349, 356 (1958)).
15. Olson, Separation of Powers Principle is No "Triviality" Legal Times, July 21, 1986, at 4,
col. 1.
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were to affect commerce, communications and the capital markets-the
life's blood of our economy. Therefore, it created agencies independent
of the Executive, and thus free from the "coercive influence" 16 of serving
at the President's will, to administer the laws governing these areas.
The SEC's independence is justified by its mandate from Congress,
to ensure the fairness and integrity of the markets and to protect inves-
tors. The SEC administers a range of statutes regulating the capital-rais-
ing process, the secondary trading markets, financial intermediaries,
collective investment vehicles and public utility holding companies.'
7
These statutes are complex and require the high degree of technical ex-
pertise that is readily acquired and maintained by an independent
agency. Indeed, technical knowledge and expertise were viewed as so
critical to effective regulation of the securities markets that Congress spe-
cifically provided for significant self-governance by the securities industry
in regulating those markets.' 8 By entrusting much of the regulation of
the markets to self-regulatory organizations such as the exchanges and
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Congress further under-
scored the need to insulate securities regulation from the vagaries of the
political process. Moreover, the SEC is required by statute to cooperate
with and oversee these self-regulatory organizations in order to fulfill its
statutory mandate. Thus, the SEC's independence is essential to the ef-
fective implementation of the statutory scheme.
Furthermore, the Commission is not solely a regulatory agency, but
is also a law enforcement agency. In addition to being able to institute
administrative proceedings, the Commission has statutory authority to
prosecute violations of the federal securities laws through civil actions in
federal district court. The Commission's discretion to prosecute is with-
out leave and free from control by the legislative and executive branches.
The recent enforcement proceedings brought by the Commission high-
light the importance of this independence. For example, the Commission
has not shied away from investigating and prosecuting a number of per-
sons of power and rank. For example, in 1984 the SEC sued J. Lynn
Helms, the chairman of the Federal Aviation Administration, charging
him with fraud in the sale of industrial bonds. Mr. Helms consented to
16. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2617.
17. The securities laws are the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (West 1981 &
West Supp. 1988); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, i §§ 78a-7811; the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, id §§ 79 to 79z-6; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, id §§ 77aaa-77bbbb; the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, id. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21; the Investment Company Act of 1940, id
§§ 80a-1 to 80a-64; and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, id §§ 78aaa-7811L The Com-
mission has responsibilities under other statutes as well.
18. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §§ 6, 15A, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78f, 78o-3 (West 1981 & West
Supp. 1988).
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the entry of an injunction without admitting or denying the SEC's allega-
tions.19 In 1985, the SEC also successfully concluded litigation with Paul
Thayer, then the Deputy Secretary of Defense, alleging that he and cer-
tain of his associates had engaged in insider trading.20 Earlier, in an
equally well-publicized case, the SEC sued T. Bertram Lance, director of
the Office of Management and Budget under President Carter, alleging
securities fraud and other violations. Mr. Lance consented to the entry
of an injunction against future violations. 2'
In the absence of the "coercive influence" of the President's unlim-
ited power to terminate, the Commission has been free to enforce the law
against the powerful and well-connected. There have been a number of
attacks on the authority of independent agencies to enforce the law that
could have precluded such successes. Some have argued that agencies
such as the SEC are constitutionally infirm because Congress's delegation
of executive power to government officials who do not serve at the plea-
sure of the President violates the separation of powers doctrine and im-
permissibly interferes with the functions of the executive branch. The
Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson 22 hopefully has laid such
arguments to rest. The case unequivocally rejects the separation of pow-
ers argument, continuing the Court's tradition of flexibly interpreting
that doctrine.
The most important factor justifying the independence of the SEC
from a particular political or economic ideology relates to the nature of
the securities markets themselves. The markets in this country reflect the
collective judgments of millions of investors, ranging from sophisticated
institutions investing millions of dollars to individuals seeking to maxi-
mize their comparatively small, but nonetheless important, savings.
Rules or legislation tied to a particular political ideology and designed to
have particular economic effect are by no means assured of success. In-
deed, it is virtually axiomatic that the market will try to overcome any
cabining regulation. However, it is also true that judicious regulatory
restraint is occasionally necessary to preserve the markets' fairness and
integrity. An independent agency seems to be the best way to achieve a
reasonable balance between the two concepts, viz., free but fair markets.
Indeed, with the increasing complexity of our personal and commercial
lives, the independent agency may be the only effective means of estab-
19. SEC v. Ascenzi Litigation, Release No. 10,541 (Sept. 25, 1984).
20. SEC v. Thayer Litigation, Release No. 10,746, slip op. (N.D. Tex. May 7, 1985).
21. SEC v. The National Bank of Georgia Litigation, Release No. 8395 [1978-79 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,402 (May 3, 1978).
22. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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lishing governmental control. Although imperfect, such agencies are cer-
tainly more of a salvation than a scourge.
III. WHAT CONSTRAINS THE SEC's INDEPENDENCE?
To say that the Commission is an independent agency is not to say
that it operates or should operate without congressional or executive con-
trol. Part I of this essay points out the significant influence that Congress
and the President have over regulatory agencies through the appoint-
ment and confirmation process. Both the legislative and executive
branches have other, less direct but potentially effective means to restrain
the activities and to shape the policies of independent agencies. The for-
mation of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (the
Working Group) is a good example of the indirect but significant impact
that the Chief Executive can have on an agency's momentum and
direction.
The Working Group was formed in March 1988 by President Rea-
gan, shortly after the Brady Commission and the SEC filed their respec-
tive reports on the October 1987 market break. The reports suggested
several possible regulatory initiatives in response to problems uncovered
by the break. These recommendations found little favor with the admin-
istration. As the SEC was poised to formulate proposed legislation, the
President issued an executive order appointing George Gould, Under
Secretary, Department of the Treasury; Wendy Gramm, Chairman of
the CFTC; Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and David Ruder, Chairman of the SEC, as
members of the Working Group. The order enjoined the SEC from tak-
ing independent action with respect to the market break prior to report-
ing the Working Group's conclusions to the President in sixty days. As a
result, submission of the Commission's legislative package was delayed
until late June 1988, just a few weeks before Congress recessed.
The courts, too, play a particularly important oversight role with
respect to the Commission's actions. Final actions of the Commission
are subject to judicial review pursuant to the federal securities laws, the
Administrative Procedure Act and other statutes. This oversight author-
ity, which applies to rules promulgated by the Commission as well as to
its adjudications in administrative proceedings, significantly restrained a
recent Commission rulemaking initiative.
In 1985, the Commission promulgated Rule 3b-9,23 which sought to
regulate the securities activities of bank subsidiaries despite the exclusion
of banks from the definition of "brokers" and "dealers" in the 1934 Act.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1988).
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The Commission attempted to accomplish this by defining the term
"bank" in the statutory exclusion as not including a bank that received
transaction-related compensation for certain brokerage activities. The
rule was promulgated in response to the bank regulators' relaxation of
their rules limiting bank involvement in the broker/dealer business. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit con-
cluded that the Commission had exceeded its authority in adopting
"Rule 3b-9... , stating that whatever its beneficial purpose or the regula-
tory need for such authority, the rule still represented an attempt by one
federal agency to reallocate, on its own initiative, the regulatory responsi-
bilities Congress has purposefully divided among several different agen-
cies."' 24 The Court declared the rule invalid.
Congress also exerts significant indirect influence over independent
agencies. For example, despite the fact that for the last several years the
SEC has collected more money in fees than it spends, the Commission,
like most agencies, depends entirely on funds authorized and appropri-
ated by Congress for its operations. The budget process provides a pow-
erful means of control. It is neither unusual nor inappropriate for
Congress to use the budget process to ensure that an agency is fulfilling
its statutory mandate. However, congressional committees have occa-
sionally used or tried to use the budget process to prohibit or derail spe-
cific actions or programs for political rather than policy reasons with
inappropriate and unfortunate results.
The Commission's "EDGAR '25 project is one example. That pro-
ject is intended to permit companies to make statutorily required filings
with the Commission electronically by computer rather than in hard
copy. It will also allow the Commission's staff and other users to obtain
instantaneous access to the reported data by computer. This is a mam-
moth undertaking and its progress has not been without technical and
logistical difficulties. Unfortunately, the project has been plagued by
political difficulties as well. As a result, one of the Commission's over-
sight committees in Congress has imposed significant restrictions on the
Commission's ability to finance the system. The current authorization
act 26 for the SEC restricts expenditures oh EDGAR for the next two
years and imposes time-consuming reporting and certification require-
ments at six-month intervals.
24. American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The court recognized
that the Commission was attempting to implement "functional regulation," a concept endorsed by
the Bush Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services.
25. "EDGAR" stands for Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval.
26. Securities and Exchange Commission Authorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-181, 101
Stat. 1249 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.).
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On July 9, 1987, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs issued a report on legislation authorizing funds for the
SEC for 1988-89.27 This report provides a more pointed example of Con-
gress's occasional effort to "micro-manage" the SEC. The report
strongly criticized SEC staff economists and their studies, and threatened
to prohibit use of appropriated funds for SEC economic studies if the
Commission did not adopt the so-called "peer review" procedures rec-
ommended by the subcommittee. Apparently, some members of the
committee disagreed with the analysis and findings of the Commission's
studies. The Commission opposed the restrictive provision; it fortunately
was not enacted.
Clearly, there is a legitimate need for congressional oversight of fed-
eral regulatory agencies. Such agencies operate under legislative man-
dates; therefore, it is appropriate that Congress monitor their activities.
However, in recent years, at least in the case of the SEC, the agency has
been subjected to the conflicting demands of a number of committees
seeking to influence it. This can create an atmosphere of intimidation
and uncertainty that ultimately may delay or completely forestall regula-
tory action. A recent congressional effort to restrain through intimida-
tion has been to pressure the SEC in connection with its proposed Rule
19(c)(4), adopted on July 7, 1988.28 Before adopting that Rule, the Com-
mission was subjected to demands for swift and decisive regulatory ac-
tion from members of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
as well as demands from members of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, that it not adopt Rule 19(c)(4) until the
agency conducted extensive studies of the need for and potential impact
of the proposed Rule.
Although probably unintentionally in most cases, Congress also has
inhibited the Commission's momentum by inundating it with a nearly
overwhelming number of requests for information on a wide range of
topics. A large percentage of an SEC Chairman's time is spent dealing
with congressional matters. In 1987, members of the Commission and its
staff testified twenty-seven times before various committees and subcom-
mittees of Congress. In addition to testimony and other congressional
liaison activities relating to legislation affecting the Commission or the
securities laws, congressmen and their staffs.made innumerable requests
for information, documents and briefings on specific items or cases.
This degree of monitoring does not come without cost. Resources
devoted to explaining the Commission's activities are necessarily diverted
27. S. REP. No. 105, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
28. Exchange Act Release No. 34-25,891, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376 (1988).
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from the agency's regulatory and law enforcement responsibilities.
Where these oversight activities are repetitious or focus unduly on spe-
cific as opposed to policy matters, the cost is unwarranted. Congress can
minimize such costs without abrogating its oversight responsibilities and
prerogatives if it relies primarily on testimony before committees and
subcommittees on matters of policy concern. Congress should not have
to routinely request information on specific matters without generalized
importance in order to oversee agency activities. It is particularly disrup-
tive when members of Congress disclose nonpublic, highly sensitive in-
formation obtained as a result of these reports and briefings.
CONCLUSION
Independent regulatory agencies have been called "peculiar cre-
ations." Indeed they are. For all their imperfections, they are peculiarly
well-structured to adapt to changing human affairs and thus assist our
democratic form of government to endure from generation to generation.
As the recent market crash demonstrated, the Commission's responsibil-
ity to regulate the securities markets is of critical importance to the eco-
nomic well-being of our nation. An independent SEC will help ensure
the proper response to the changing conditions in tomorrow's markets,
just as it has contributed to the development of the U.S. securities mar-
kets as they exist today.
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